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SPECIAL EDUCATION YEAR IN REVIEW: WHAT'S NEW
LEGALLY AND So WHAT FOR Us?
Lynwood E. Beekman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to present and discuss various
rulings regarding special education published over the last year. The-
se are not necessarily rulings that would be in the headlines of a
newspaper or in professional publications. Rather, these are rulings
that have practical significance or include a valuable lesson. Instead
of a more scholarly approach, this Article will examine what the cas-
es mean for us as lawyers for parents, lawyers for school districts,
lawyers for administrators, or in our role as hearing officers.
II. ELIGIBILITY/EVALUATIONS
A. Observation by Independent Evaluator
School Board of Manatee County v. L.H. ex rel. D.H.' in-
volved a school district that had an unwritten policy of preventing the
parents' psychologist from observing in the classroom as part of an
evaluation, in which the parents were contending that a psychologist
was necessary for them "to effectively participate in the development
of' their child's Individualized Education Program ("IEP") and exer-
cise their right to an Independent Education Evaluation ("IEE").2
Lynwood E. Beekman does business at Special Education Solutions in Michigan. He has
zealously represented families of children with disabilities and school districts on matters of
special education over the last forty years. While currently serving as the mediator and
trainer of mediators and hearing officers across the country, he has also served as a state and
local hearing officer, compliance investigator, mediator, and arbitrator in approximately one
thousand special education matters. This Article is based on a presentation given at the Prac-
tising Law Institute's Tenth Annual School Law Institute in New York, New York.
I No. 8:08-cv-1435-T-33MAP, 2009 WL 3231914 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009).
2 Id. at *1 & n.1.
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The administrative law judge ("AL") agreed and the court affirmed,
relying in part upon Letter to Mamas3 from the Office of Special Ed-
ucation Programs ("OSEP") which acknowledged the need for a par-
ent to sometimes be able to enter the classroom and bring his or her
expert along with them.4 The court rejected the school district's ar-
gument that Letter to Mamas applied only to IEEs at the public's ex-
pense.
So what does that mean? First, school districts should take a
look at their district-wide or building policies, either written or un-
written, with regard to visitation. School districts should also be
careful with regard to how they treat that parent or expert. They
should treat him or her as if there were no hearing or potential dis-
pute. It is clear from Manatee County, as well as Letter to Mamas,
that there are going to be occasions where a parent is going to have
the right to observe in order to effectively exercise his or her right to
an independent evaluation, the right to information about or participa-
tion in the IEP, or most significantly, the right to present meaningful
well-founded testimony at a hearing.6
However, when you bring an expert into the schoolhouse and
classroom, there are a potential host of problems that school districts
must consider. For example, how long is the observation going to
last? How many times is the expert going to come and observe? Is
there going to be any interaction with staff during the course of ob-
servation? Can the observation be made without disruption?7
With regard to the ABA cases-the Applied Behavior Analy-
sis-there are a lot of situations where school districts are being
asked to reimburse parents for home-based programs or to fund those
programs.' If a school district is being asked to fund or reimburse
these types of programs, it ought to be able to go into the home.'
3 Id. at *3; Letter to Mamas, 42 IDELR 10, 48 (OSEP May 26, 2004).
4 Manatee County, 2009 WL 3231914, at *3.
5 Id. (holding that the court was not persuaded "that it should differentiate between the
public and private expensed IEEs when determining access to classroom observation").
6 See id.
7 Some of these factors are discussed in In re Student with a Disability, 43 IDELR 214
(Nev. State Educational Agency June 21, 2005).
8 See Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The
[plaintiffs] . . . requested that the School System fund a 40-hour per week home based ABA
program for the summer, as well as provide for year-round speech therapy.").
9 See, e.g., id.
1148 [Vol. 26
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However, the same types of conditions need to be applied in this situ-
ation as are applied with regard to disruption in the classroom.o
This effectively amounts to pseudo-discovery, which most
hearing officers would generally not allow." But with regard to this
fundamental observation, which is so critical to both sides in certain
circumstances, the parties should go to the hearing officer if any
problems cannot be worked out. In addition, the school districts
sometimes get concerned about the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act ("FERPA")12 implications. However, if the parents'
counsel asks the hearing officer for a protective order, it would more
than satisfy an illegitimate concern of the school districts in terms of
the FERPA order.13
B. Adverse Affect
Adverse affect is a condition for eligibility under the Individ-
uals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").14 However, there is
no definition of the term in the IDEA, and as Marshall Joint School
District No. 2 v. C.D. ex rel. Brian & Traci D.15 points out, one must
look to state law for the definition of "adverse affect."' 6 Thus, ad-
verse affect can be critical in terms of the eligibility determination."
C. Socially Maladjusted
Eschenasy ex rel. A.E. v. New York City Department of Edu-
cation'8 points out a big mistake made by too many school districts.19
10 See, e.g., Dorian G. ex rel. Cristina S. v. Sobel, No. 93 CV 0687, 1994 WL 876707, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1994) (requesting reimbursement for tuition expenses for enrolling
child in a private school for emotionally disturbed children).
1 See, e.g., C.B. & R.B. ex rel. W.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 02 CV 4620(CLP),
2005 WL1388964, *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2005).
12 Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (West 2010).
13 See, e.g., Ragusa v. Malveme Union Free Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
14 Mr. I ex rel. L.I. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007).
1 592 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (W.D. Wis. 2009), rev'd, 616 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2010).
6 Id. at 1078 ("Neither the [IDEA] nor the regulations define 'adversely affects,' leaving
the states to give meaning to this term.").
17 See generally id.
18 604 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
19 See id. at 643 (find that student should have been "classified as a student with emotional
disturbance" and parents were entitled to reimbursement).
2011] 1149
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The teenager in this case engaged in a host of problematic behaviors,
many of which manifested outside of the school setting.20 The school
district took the position that the student was socially maladjusted,
and therefore not emotionally disturbed.21
As this case points out, the two classifications-one being so-
cially maladjusted, and the other being emotionally disturbed-are
not mutually exclusive.22 A child can be socially maladjusted and
still meet the characteristics to be identified as emotionally dis-
turbed.23 Given the serious nature of the student's needs, classifying
the child as socially maladjusted, but not as emotionally disturbed
when he was eligible, was an extremely expensive mistake on the
part of the school district.24
III. IEPs/IEPT MEETINGS
A. Right to Appeal Old/Agreed Upon IEPs
One of the biggest responsibilities a hearing officer has is to
make sense of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA").25 In this regard, Letter to Lipsitt26 has significant potential
ramifications for both parents and school districts in terms of destabi-
lizing the entire process. 27 The letter states that even though a school
district has given a parent all the protections required under the
IDEA, if a parent agrees with the IEP and it goes into effect, within
the two-year statute of limitations period the parent can still appeal
the IEP.28
Looking at the scheme of the IDEA in terms of the protec-
tions offered to the parent with regard to notice of procedural safe-
guards, organizations to assist in understanding IDEA rights, and in-
20 Id. at 643-44 ("She stole, broke school rules, obtained a tattoo and body piercings, made
inappropriate friends on the internet, began using drugs, and ran away from home.").
21 Id. at 643, 645-46.
22 Id. at 647 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A) (West 2010)).
23 See Eschenasy, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 647 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)).
24 Id. at 654.
25 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1482 (West 2010).
26 52 IDELR 47, 227 (OSEP Dec. 11, 2008).
27 See generally id. (discussing that a parent may request a due process hearing regarding
an IEP that they previously accepted).
28 See id.
1150 [Vol. 26
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terpreter services, is there any equitable relief that might be possible
if a school district does everything required, yet the parent's action or
inaction leads to the implementation of the IEP?29 Technically yes,
but practically, Lipsitt is proliferating litigation.30 The OSEP's argu-
ment is that the law does not require the parent to agree to the IEP;
parents can appeal, thereby placing the burden on hearing officers to
sort out the issues.3 1 This is not a responsible interpretation of the
IDEA, given that the scheme of the Act is to foster the goal of good
faith cooperation.32
OSEP letters are entitled to deference absent a cogent reason
29 See id.
30 id
3' Lipsitt, 52 IDELR at 227.
32 The IDEA establishes procedural safeguards intended for use by the parents to protect
the rights of the child to be utilized prior to filing a due process complaint or civil action.
This "exhaustion" requirement is intended to limit formal litigation. Compare N.B. v. Hell-
gate Elem. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Dir., Missoula Cnty., Mont., 541 F.3d 1202, 1208-09 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that the school district "did not fulfill its [procedural] statutory obliga-
tions" to the parents of an autistic child without ensuring that the proper assessments were
conducted; it was not sufficient that the district referred the parents to a testing center, as it
was the district's responsibility to see that the testing in fact occurred), with 20 U.S.C.A. §
1415(1) (West 2010)
[B]efore the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is
also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f)
[impartial due process hearing] and (g) [appeals] shall be exhausted to
the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under
this subchapter.
See also Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Phil L. ex rel. Matthew L., 559 F. Supp. 2d 634, 643 (E.D.
Pa. 2008) ("Thus, to the extent that any claim seeks relief that is 'available' under the IDEA,
the IDEA's administrative remedies must be exhausted before such an action is brought."),
amended by No. 08-982, 2008 WL 3539886, at *5-*6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2008); see also El-
lenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1275 (10th Cir. 2007)
[The] claims ultimately fail because the [plaintiffs] did not exhaust the
IDEA's administrative procedures before filing a lawsuit against [the de-
fendants] ..... Congress required that parents turn first to the statute's
administrative framework to resolve any conflicts they had with the
school's educational services." We have interpreted the IDEA's exhaus-
tion requirements broadly, noting Congress' clear intention to allow
those with experience in educating the nation's disabled children "at
least the first crack at formulating a plan to overcome the consequences
of educational shortfalls."
(internal citations omitted); see also Hayes ex rel. Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377, 877
F.2d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting the "philosophy of the [IDEA] is that plaintiffs are
required to utilize the elaborate administrative scheme established by the Act before resort-
ing to the courts to challenge the actions of the local school authorities").
5
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not to adhere to them, e.g. violating the IDEA. 33 Accordingly, a hear-
ing officer ought to be very careful when not following this type of
letter.34
B. Obligation to Generalize Skills
Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P.35 is a
Tenth Circuit decision following earlier decisions coming from the
First and Eleventh Circuits.36  In this case, the parents of a fourteen-
year-old student with autism contended that his IEP was inappropri-
ate because it "failed to address adequately his inability to generalize
functional behavior learned at school to the home and other environ-
ments."3 7 The parents insisted that "[t]he ability to generalize . . . is
'fundamental' and without it 'learning does not exist.' "3 "Absent
the ability to generalize skills learned at school, particularly basic self
help and social skills, [the parents argued their son's] education [was]
See, e.g., Pardini ex rel. Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 191-92
(3d Cir. 2005) (" '[T]he level of deference to be accorded to such interpretive rules depends
upon their persuasiveness.' In evaluating persuasiveness we consider such factors as the
thoroughness, reasoning, and consistency with other agency pronouncements." (internal cita-
tions omitted). The Pardini court ultimately reversed the district court's decision, which re-
lied in part on a letter from the OSEP, because "the OSEP never explained how it reached
[its] conclusion" in the letter. Id. at 192. See Orange Cnty. Dep't of Educ. v. A.S., 567 F.
Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (C.D. Ca. 2008) (the court gave significant authoritative weight to
OSEP letters using them to support its holding, as the letters were consistent with case law
and statutory regulations). See also Ringwood Bd. of Educ. v. K.H.J. ex rel. K.F.J., 469 F.
Supp. 2d 267, 270-71 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing Steven C. ex rel. Michael C. v. Radnor Twp.
Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 649 (3d Cir. 2000)); Chester Cnty. Intermediate Unit v. Pa. Blue
Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 815 (3d Cir. 1990). See generally Perry Zirkel, Do OSEP Policy Let-
ters Have Legal Weight?, 171 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 391 (2003).
34 See, e.g., D.P. ex rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 483 F.3d 725, 729, 731 (1 th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting parents' reliance on Pardini because the plain language of the relevant
statute was unambiguous and thus the court did not need to rule on whether the agency's in-
terpretation was reasonable). The court also stated that "[w]e think [Pardini] was incorrectly
decided . . . . We do note, however, that our interpretation of the statute is consistent with
that of the Department of Education." Id. at 730. See also R.C. & S.C. ex rel. R.J.C. v.
Carmel Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 06 Civ. 5495(CLB), 2007 WL 1732429, at *2-3, *5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2007) (affirming decision of SRO, which distinguished Pardini and thus relied in
part on the OSEP letter that Pardini had rejected).
" 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
36 Id. at 1150 n.7 (citing Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.
2001); Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Educ., 254 F.3d 350, 351-52 (1st Cir. 2001); JSK
ex rel. JX & PGK v. Hendry Cnty. Sch. Bd., 941 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991)).
31 Id. at 1145, 1150.
I1-d at 115 0.
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effectively worthless."39
The school district replied that "as a matter of law, generaliza-
tion across settings [was] not required by [the] IDEA so long as [a
student was] making some progress in school." 40 The court found for
the school district, holding that Congress did not, in the IDEA, guar-
antee self-sufficiency.41 The court did acknowledge another court's
suggestion "that in some instances difficulty generalizing skills may
be so severe that it prevents a student from receiving any educational
benefit."42 In that case, the IEP would need to address it in some
fashion, albeit maybe not in a residential placement.43 But the court
reversed the conclusions of the hearing officer and state review of-
ficer below that such progress "was meaningless if there was no
strategy to [e]nsure that those skills would be transferred outside the
school environment."4
It is difficult to square this court's ruling that generalization is
not required when taking into account the purposes and policies un-
derlying the transition aspect of an IEP.45 The court also failed to
39 id.
Thompson R2-JSch. Dist., 540 F.3d at 1150.
41 Id. at 1150-51 ("We are constrained to agree with the school district and our sister
courts. Though one can well argue that generalization is a critical skill for self-sufficiency
and independence, we cannot agree with [the parents] that [the] IDEA always attaches essen-
tial importance to it.").
42 Id. at 1152 (citing Gonzalez, 254 F.3d at 353).
43 Id. ("In such situations, our sister court held, an IEP 'must address such problems in
some fashion, even if they do not warrant residential placement.' " (quoting Gonzalez, 254
F.3d at 353)).
44 Id. at 1154.
45 Compare Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 1143, with K.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Mans-
field Indep. Sch. Dist., 618 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
[T]he IDEA defines "transition services" as a coordinated set of activi-
ties within a results-oriented process focused on improving the academic
and functional achievement of the child to facilitate movement to post-
school activities based on the individual child's needs, strengths, prefer-
ences, and interests and "includes instruction, related services, communi-
ty experiences, the development of employment and other post-school
adult living objectives, and, when appropriate, acquisition of daily living
skills and functional vocational evaluation."
Id. at 574 (quoting 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(34)(C) (West 2010); see New Milford Bd. of Educ.
v. C.R. ex rel. T.R., Civ. A. No. 09-328 (JLL), 2010 WL 2571343, at *3 (D.N.J. June 22,
2010) ("The education provided under the IDEA must be constructed so as to meet a disa-
bled child's unique needs and provide 'significant learning,' including a meaningful educa-
tional benefit in the least restrictive environment." (citing D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602
F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010))).
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consider community-based instruction in its decision.46 Additionally,
the court ignored the fundamental behavioral principle that it is nec-
essary to generalize behavior in order to be successful. 47 Thus, in ad-
vocating and participating in the development of IEPs, particularly
with regard to transition, it is important to include provisions ensur-
ing that students are able to generalize.
C. Uncooperative Parents
In Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema v. Academy School District No.
20,48 the parents of a three-year-old boy came into an Individualized
Education Planning Team ("IEPT") meeting seeking reimbursement
for the cost of a home-based autism program.4 9 The school district
presented the parents with a draft IEP and, as a result of initial dis-
cussions, made verbal offers to increase services.50 Once the parents
learned the school district intended to deliver the services in an inte-
grated preschool setting, they refused to participate.5 ' The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that a parent's refusal to participate in the IEP process effec-
tively excused any procedural defects in the IEP's formation. 2 In
particular, the court found the parents' conduct excused the school
district's failure to provide the parents with a final IEP.53
These cases show that parents will be held to the same "good
4 Compare Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 1143, with Rosinsky ex rel. Rosinsky v.
Green Bay Area Sch. Dist., 667 F. Supp. 2d.985, 985-86 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (stating that, alt-
hough the goals of the student's IEP, which included a goal of "increasing independence in
the community," may not have been as extensive as the parents would like, "they were
measurable and were formulated to provide [the student] a basic floor of opportunity") (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
47 Compare Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 1143, with Doe ex reL Doe v. Hampden-
Wilbraham Reg'l Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 08cvl2094-NG, 2010 WL 2132799, at *9, *10
(D. Mass. May 25, 2010) (The IEP in question stated, "[The student] needs to be taught to
mastery before going on. Mastered items need to be reinforced to ensure continued mastery
and generalization to all settings. [The student] needs 1:1 teaching of skills, generalizing
them to all settings.").
" 538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008).
49 Id. at 1310.
s0 Id. at 1309-10.
s' Id. at 1310.
52 Id. at 1315 ("The hearing officer's findings of fact indicate that the Sytsemas unilateral-
ly terminated the IEP development process . . . . [T]hat decision precluded them from mean-
ingfully participating in the complete IEP development process. Thus, we conclude that the
lack of a final IEP did not substantively harm Nicholas [Sytsema].").
5 Sytsema, 538 F.3d at 1314-15.
1154 [Vol. 26
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faith" or "open mind" standard as school districts with respect to their
obligation to cooperatively participate in the IEP development pro-
cess. 54 It is now a two-way street and parents must cooperate and act
in good faith." The Sixth Circuit has also stated that the IDEA rules
apply both to parents and school districts,5 6 and has often discussed
partnership in the IEP development process.57 These cases suggest
that parents need to understand that although they have extremely
strong feelings with regard to what is best for their child, such does
not mean they have the right to dictate the result of the IEP process.
Instead, the parents must go into these meetings with an open mind
and good faith.59
D. Predetermination
In TP. & S.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free School
District,60 the parents sought reimbursement for their in-home ABA
services. 61 Prior to the IEP, the school district staff had discussed the
child's services and came to the meeting with a chart outlining the
54 See id.; Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d at 1154-55 (referencing exhaustion re-
quirements and parents' obligation to exercise procedural safeguards).
5 Sytsema, 538 F.3d at 1314-15 (relying on MM ex rel. DM & EM v. Sch. Dist. of
Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 535 (4th Cir. 2002)); see Hjortness ex rel. Hjortness v.
Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Thompson R2-J Sch.
Dist., 540 F.3d at 1154-55.
56 See, e.g., Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460 (6th Cir. 1990).
A school district must heed these requirements, particularly those "giv-
ing parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage
in the administrative process," including the formulation of an IEP. We
emphasize today that the parents likewise are obligated to operate within
the Act's procedural framework.
Id. at 1466 (internal citation omitted).
57 See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (6th Cir. 1990)
("[B]ecause [the] parents were allowed to participate fully in the development of [their
child's] . .. IEP, the procedural requirements of the [Act] were met even though two items
were omitted from the document."); see also Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513,
520 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court should not have found that the pro-
cedural deficiencies in question denied the student a FAPE because "[t]he evidence . . .
showed that [parents] participated in the IEP meetings, had regular communication with the
teachers and special education staff, and were engaged in [the student's] schooling on a daily
basis").
58 See cases cited supra notes 55 & 57.
59 id.
554 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 249-51.
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recommendations of its behavioral consultant comparing them with
the recommendations of the parents' independent evaluator.62 Since
the school district listened, offered various ideas, and even accepted
many of the parents' recommendations, the district was found to have
had an open mind and had not predetermined the child's IEP.
Conversely, in H.B. ex rel. Penny B. v. Las Virgenes Unified
School District,64 at the IEPT meeting the school district's superin-
tendent stated that the IEPT would be discussing how the student
would transition from the current private school placement to a public
school.6 ' The court found that the superintendent's statement showed
predetermination in that the district was unwilling to consider the
possibility of continuing the student's private school placement.66
Thus, the school district failed to have an open mind to at least give
meaningful consideration to the parents' concerns and proposals.67
In L.MP. ex rel. E.P. v. School Board of Broward County,68
the parent claimed that the Local Educational Agency ("LEA") had a
policy of denying a request for one-to-one ABA services, and sought
records concerning the IDEA services the LEA provided to other au-
tistic students.69 The school district refused, stating that it could not
do so without the other parents' consent.70 However, the court noted
that both FERPA and state law permitted such disclosure without
consent upon court order.7 1 The court granted the parents' request,
explaining that the information about the services provided to other
autistic students was "crucial" to the litigation.72 The court also not-
ed that the parents sought an order to protect the confidentiality of the
disclosed information that would protect the privacy of other stu-
dents.
62 Id. at 249-50.
63 Id. at 253 ("S.P.'s parents have failed to show that Mamaroneck did not have an open
mind as to the content of S.P.'s IEP. Both Young and the Committee chairperson testified
that there was no premeeting agreement to adopt Young's recommendations.").
64 52 IDELR 163, 829 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008).
6 Id. at 830.
6 Id. 830-31.
67 id.
6 53 IDELR 49, 251 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2009).
69 Id. 252-53.
70 Id. 253.
71 id
72 id
73 L.MP., 53 IDELR at 253.
1156 [Vol. 26
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In terms of predetermination, Solana Beach School District74
poses a host of questions that a hearing officer might consider in de-
termining a claim of predetermination.s Predetermination cases with
regard to controversial methodologies are increasing. Therefore,
school districts need to pay close attention to these cases with regard
to not only what administrators are saying, but also what administra-
tors are actually doing in response to some of these approaches-for
example, methodologies that parents are suggesting as appropriate
and necessary.
E. Self-Sufficiency, Not Just Accommodation
In A.C. ex rel. M C. v. Board of Education of the Chappaqua
Central School District,77 the parents put their child in a private
school and sought reimbursement contending the school district pro-
moted "learned helplessness" by assigning their son his own aide to
redirect him when he lost focus or became disruptive. The Second
Circuit found for the school district and struck down the claim be-
cause the child's IEP provided for the aide to decrease the level of
prompting and redirection when the child improved his ability to fo-
cus and stay on task.79
In Kingsport City School System v. JR. ex rel. Rentz,8 0 a child
with poor interaction skills had a bad behavior intervention plan that
was supposed to improve his skills in this regard.8' But rather than
provide counseling or social skills training, the plan required the stu-
dent to refrain from name calling or making inappropriate comments
that provoked violent reactions from his peers.82 After the student
withdrew from school after a series of fights, the school district pro-
74 49 IDELR 237, 1055 (Cal. State Educ. Agency Jan. 7, 2008).
" See id at 1071.
76 See, e.g., L.MP., 53 IDELR 49; T.P., 554 F.3d 247; Penny B., 52 IDELR 163 (C.D. of
Cal. Mar. 26, 2008); Solana Beach, 49 IDELR 1055.
77 553 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2009).
78 Id. at 170.
79 Id. at 173 ("We therefore defer to the SRO's finding that the IEP adequately addressed
the need for M.C. to develop independence, and thus was not substantively deficient under
the IDEA." (citing Karl ex rel. Karl v. Bd. of Educ. of Geneseo Cent. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d
873, 877 (2d Cir. 1984))).
80 No. 2:06-CV-234, 2008 WL 4138109 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2008).
81 Id. at *2.
82 id.
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posed the use of a shadow escort to accompany the student at all
times." The court upheld the AL's finding that the plans provision
of an escort prevented the student from developing appropriate social
skills, a point which the school district's expert had supported.84
This line of cases started with JL. v. Mercer Island School
District,5 which was a 2006 case from Washington. 86 In this case,
the court emphasized the goals of providing independence and self-
sufficiency, criticizing that the school district's use of an aide result-
ed in "learned helplessness."" These cases point out that school dis-
tricts should be cautious when providing aides, as it is more im-
portant to teach the child skills to the fullest extent possible, rather
than having the aide simply complete tasks for the child. To prevent
any problems, school districts should include in an IEP that if an aide
will be provided, the child will be weaned off the aide as the appro-
priate skills are developed.
F. Flexible Scheduling of IEPT Meetings
In Letter to Thomas,8 OSEP was asked whether the IDEA al-
lowed school districts to unilaterally limit the times for conducting
IEPT meetings to normal school hours, based in part on school dis-
tricts' work hours as provided in union contracts.89 OSEP said it was
not unreasonable for school districts to schedule meetings during
regular school or business hours because it is likely those times
would be most suitable for its staff to attend meetings. 90 In those cir-
cumstances where a parent could not attend a meeting scheduled dur-
ing the day because his or her employment restricted his or her avail-
ability, OSEP stated that school districts should be flexible to
accommodate reasonable requests. 9' If school districts and parents
cannot schedule meetings accommodating their respective needs,
8 Id. at *4.
* Id. at *4-5.
8 No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 6, 2006), rev'd, 592 F.3d 938 (9th
Cir. 2010).
86 Id.
* Id. at *6.
* 51 IDELR 224, 1189 (OSEP June 3, 2008).
'9 Id. at 1190.
9 Id.
91 Id.
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then school districts must take other steps to ensure parental partici-
92
pation.
Too often, IEP meetings are getting longer and more people
are being invited-which in turn impacts scheduling and gives rise to
a host of legal challenges.93 IEP meetings need to be simpler, shorter,
and involve less people while maintaining a cooperative effort to de-
velop an IEP. To improve this situation, parents and school districts
should identify a school district staff member to do some preplanning
for the IEP meeting. This person could draft an IEP developed with
the parents and determine with the parents who actually needs to be
present at the IEP meeting, which will effectively make the meetings
shorter and less involved.
G. Methodology and Peer-Reviewed Research
In Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified School Dis-
trict,94 the parents of an autistic child alleged that the school district
"failed to provide . . . a Free and Appropriate Public Education
("FAPE")."95 The parents contended that the school district's eclec-
tic approach used various models that had not been peer-reviewed
and that an applied behavioral analysis program was the only one
supported by research as being effective. 96 The school district main-
tained that it retained the discretion to determine methodology and
that the primary component of its program had support in peer-
reviewed research.97 Further, the school district claimed the reason
the other components had not been peer-reviewed was because some
of them were new.
The ALJ first noted that the IDEA does not mandate the use
of a particular methodology and that the most important issue was
whether the proposed instructional method met the student's needs
92 See id.
9 See, e.g., Doe, 2010 WL 2132799, at *7; see also LAWRENCE M. SIEGEL, THE COMPLETE
IEP GUIDE: HOW TO ADVOCATE FOR YOUR SPECIAL ED CHILD 123 (Betsy Simmons ed., Nolo
5th ed. 2007).
9 319 F. App'x 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
9 Id. at 694.
96 Id. at 695.
9 Id. at 694.
98 Id. at 695.
2011] 1159
13
Beekman: Special Education Year in Review: What's New Legally and So What
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAWREVIEW
and allowed the student to make adequate educational progress. 99
The AU then set forth OSEP's comments to its recent regulations at
some length regarding the peer-reviewed research requirement.'00
The ALJ found that the school district's program did provide a fair
and appropriate education under this standard given its demonstrated
success by meeting the student's individual needs.' 0 Both the dis-
trict court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the AL's decision.102 This
case is probably the most definitive case dealing with what was
thought to be extremely problematic language with regard to peer-
reviewed research.
H. Recording Meetings
Although the law does not say anything about tape recording
meetings, OSEP has ruled that a school district must allow meetings
to be tape-recorded if necessary (1) to ensure that the parents under-
stand the IEP; (2) for parents to implement other guaranteed parental
rights; or (3) if the parents have a disability. 03 In Horen v. Board of
Education of the City of Toledo Public School District,104 the LEA re-
fused to proceed with an IEPT meeting when the parents demanded
they be allowed to record it.'05 As a result, the child had no IEP and
the LEA sought a hearing requesting, among other things, that the
parents be directed to participate in IEPT meetings without making
audio or video recordings absent prior agreement of the LEA.106 The
court affirmed the hearing officer's decision that the parent had no
such right under these circumstances.' 07 While aware of the district's
policy, the parents' lawyer failed to come up with a reason that fit
within one of the three exceptions.'08
9 Joshua, 319 F. App'x at 695.
' Id. ("[A]n eclectic approach similar to the one proposed by [the school district meets]
the IDEA's substantive requirements.").
101 Id
102 id.
103 See V.W. v. Favolise, 131 F.R.D. 654, 657 (D. Conn. 1990) (allowing the recording of
a meeting where a parent had a disabling injury to her hand which prevented her from taking
notes, and in turn prevented her from effectively evaluating her child's IEP).
104 655 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
os Id. at 798.
106 Id.
107Id.
"' Id. at 804.
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In too many problematic situations parents want to record
meetings and, too often, school districts react negatively to such re-
quests.'09 School districts and their counsel should strongly consider
allowing meetings to be recorded because these recordings can pro-
vide confirmation of what the staff members have said at the meet-
ings. When meetings are recorded, the people being recorded-for
example, the teacher or the psychologist-often choose their words
more carefully, are more professional, and have a better basis for
their opinions. Thus, recording meetings can have a lot of positive
benefits for both parents and school districts.
IV. PROGRAMS AND RELATED SERVICES
A. Audio-Video Surveillance as a Related Service
J.T. ex rel. Harvell v. Missouri State Board of Education t o
involved a seventeen-year-old student who was severely disabled."1 '
It was alleged that the student's skills had regressed in many areas
over the last few years due to the failure of the school district staff to
implement his IEPs." 2 As a result of not receiving occupational and
physical therapy, the student was forced to spend most of his day in a
wheelchair."' The parents requested that the school "install a [twen-
ty-four] hour audio and video surveillance, or some other independ-
ent monitoring scheme, in all classrooms and hallways" for the pur-
pose of allowing the student's parents to independently view the
activities at the school relating to implementation of the student's
IEP, including his safety.1 4 The court denied the state's motion to
dismiss, stating that the definition of related services was not exhaus-
tive, and, therefore, the audio-visual surveillance could be considered
a related service.'15
One problem with this decision is that the court was anticipat-
109 See, e.g., Horen, 655 F. Supp. 2d 794.
"o No. 4:08CV1431RWS, 2009 WL 262094 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4,2009).
... Id. at *1.
112 Id.
" Id. (stating that J.T. was forced to sit in the wheelchair for so long that his "body con-
formed to the shape of his sitting position in the wheelchair").
114 Id. at *6.
us Id. at *7, *11 (citing Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F.,
526 U.S. 66, 73 (1999)).
11612011]
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ing a potential violation of the IEP, which the court does not have the
jurisdiction to consider. Although this may not have been a well
thought out or well founded decision, it does show how far some
courts might be willing to go in terms of defining "related services."
B. Staff Shortages/Substitutes
In Washington County Public Schools,116 an LEA faced a
sudden unexpected shortage of physical therapists and acknowledged
it failed to implement one child's Individualized Family Service Plan
("IFSP") for two months."'7 Given it had resumed providing services
as soon as it could and offered makeup sessions, no corrective action
was taken.' 18 However, the LEA was ordered to "provide make-up
services to any other children who missed physical therapy ses-
sions." 1 9
In Richland Springs Independent School District,l 20 a one-on-
one aide in a physical education class had to take over for the teacher
on frequent occasion when she was absent.12' Not only did the stu-
dent fail to receive what his IEP required, but given the student's
heart condition, the lack of the aide's "extra set of eyes" posed a safe-
ty risk for the student.122 The school district was found to have de-
nied the student FAPE. 123
In Westview School Corp. & The Northeast Indiana Special
Education Cooperative,'24 the least restrictive environment ("LRE")
section of the student's IEP required that the school district provide a
sign language interpreter.12 5 The school district was directed to ad-
just the IEP to address this shortcoming and provide compensatory
educational services for the days the student was without an inter-
preter.126
116 53 IDELR 105, 503 (Md. State Educ. Agency Apr. 27, 2009).
117 Id. at 503-04.
1 Id. at 504.
" Id. at 503.
120 51 IDELR 144, 748 (Tex. State Educ. Agency June 2, 2008).
121 Id. at 749.
122 id.
" Id. at 750.
124 51 IDELR 27, 148 (Ind. State Educ. Agency July 31, 2008).
125 Id. at 149-50.
126 Id. at 150.
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Lastly, in North Lyon County (KS) Unified School District,1 27
a parent complained that the school district had failed to implement
her daughter's 504 plan because a substitute teacher did not give her
the opportunity to correct assignments according to the IEP.128 As a
result, the student was failing.129 The school district settled in this
case. 130
All of these cases point out a big problem: staff shortages fos-
ter too much litigation and hurt children in a situation where a simple
solution could be reached. School districts need to be more up-front
and communicate to parents that they are making the effort to get the
best qualified persons they can in the classroom and have some kind
of backup plan for substitute teachers.
C. Advising Regarding Specific Responsibilities
The IDEA has gone overboard from a prescriptive standpoint,
dictating what to do in special education and how to do it.' 3 ' A cou-
ple of re-authorizations ago, in response to the fact that about seven-
ty-five percent of all complaints were due to school districts allegedly
not adhering to the IEP, Congress finally stated that school districts
must communicate to the providers of service what their responsibili-
ties entail. 3 2 The providers must be told what accommodations and
modifications they are supposed to make on behalf of the student if
he or she is in the provider's classroom.133
Too often, school districts do not communicate these neces-
sary accommodations to providers. It seems that in situations where
there are alleged violations of IEPs, school districts do not follow this
commonsense approach that is dictated by law. The law does not
dictate a specific form; it simply requires that the providers of service
be told what their responsibilities entail.134 A commonsense solution
such as a form, however, could eliminate a lot of the problems and
127 51 IDELR 109, 572 (Office for Civil Rights, Midwestern Div., Kan. City Aug. 20,
2008).
121 Id. at 573-74.
129 Id. at 575.
130 Id. at 576-77.
131 See generally IDEA, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400.
132 34 C.F.R. 300.323(d) (2010).
133 See, e.g., N. Lyon Cnty., 41 IDELR at 573-74.
1 See generally 34 C.F.R. 300.323.
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litigation in this area with regard to specific responsibilities.
D. Service Dogs
In Bakersfield City School District,"'5 the parents of a seventh
grade autistic student sought to have the student's dog identified as a
related service in the IEP.'3 6 The parents' experts testified that stu-
dents with autism make great progress when they work with service
dogs."' The ALJ noted that the studies relied upon by the experts
were merely anecdotal in nature.138 Additionally, the ALJ stated that
the parents' experts did not know whether the use of service dogs for
educational purposes had been endorsed by autism experts or whether
there were any peer-reviewed studies endorsing the use of dogs for
such purpose. 139 Although not presented in this case, there are stud-
ies regarding the use of service dogs in educational settings, in which
educational experts endorse their use in certain situations. 140
The parents' request to have the service dog included as a re-
lated service was rejected on two grounds.141 One reason was that
under the definition of "related services," a service dog is not re-
quired in order to assist the child for the benefit of special educa-
tion.142 The other reason noted by the ALJ was that the school dis-
trict's offer of a one-on-one aide was not as restrictive an option as
the use of a service dog since the aide could be faded out.143
135 51 IDELR 142, 733 (Cal. State Educ. Agency Oct. 22, 2008).
136 Id. at 734.
137 Id. at 739-40.
138 Id. at 740.
139 Id.
140 See generally, Merope Pavlides, Autism Service Dogs, MONTGOMERY CNTY. HUMANE
Soc'Y, http://www.mchumane.org/DogsAutism.shtml (last visited Aug. 13, 2010).
141 Bakersfield, 51 IDELR at 743.
142 Id. at 744. In his opinion, ALJ Gregory P. Cleveland looked to the definitions of "re-
lated services" under the IDEA and section 56363 (a) of the California Education Code,
finding no reference to service dogs. Id. at 742. Accordingly, the service dog's presence in
school was not a necessary program or service for the student with special needs to receive
FAPE. Id.
143 The opinion explains why a one-on-one aide is a less restrictive means than the use of
the service dog:
An aide can back off from Student according to circumstances, whereas
Thor would be constantly at Student's side throughout the day. Similar-
ly, a human aide can gauge the extent of re-direction Student needs
much more so than Thor can . . . . Student's aide started out working
close by Student and would move away and come back as needed. The
1164 [Vol. 26
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss4/4
2011] SPECIAL EDUCATION YEAR IN RE VIEW 1165
E. Misbehavior on the Bus
In Prince Georges County Public School,14 4 a student's mis-
conduct on a bus caused him to be disciplined twelve times and miss
four days of school.145 Although the IEP team met, they did not ad-
dress the conduct.146 In response, the parent filed a complaint.147 The
State Education Agency ("SEA") noted that when a student's "behav-
ior impedes his learning or that of others, the [IEPT] must consider
appropriate strategies" or interventions to address the behavior.14 8
Indeed, the fundamental obligations under the IDEA with regard to
the LRE-addressing behaviors, and informing providers of their re-
sponsibilities under an IEP or behavior intervention plan ("BIP")-all
apply to transportation just as they do in the classroom.14 9
F. Legal Standard for Related Services
In Marion County (NC) School District #7,0 the parent of a
student with cerebral palsy wanted the LEA to provide additional
physical therapy to make him physically stronger."' His current IEP
provided for physical therapy given that he was unable to use his mo-
aide tried to allow Student to work as independently as possible. Addi-
tionally, Student's own evidence does not support use of Thor instead of
an aide. Dr. McAmis testified Student's aide should be faded out as
Student learned to utilize proper replacement behaviors, but if that were
true, Student would be more restricted by Thor's presence, than by an
aide that fades over time.
Id at 740-41.
" Id. at 1387.
145 Prince Georges Cnty. Pub. Sch., 52 IDELR at 1388.
146Id. In reviewing the file, the Superintendent found no documentation showing that the
IEPT addressed or discussed the student's behavioral problems while riding the school bus.
Id
147 Id. The parents of the 14-year-old student "withdrew [their] consent for the student to
receive special education and related services and requested that the student begin to attend"
a general education high school. Prince Georges Cnty. Pub. Sch., 52 IDELR at 1388. Less
than a month later, the student's mother filed a complaint with Maryland State Department
of Education alleging that (1) PGCPS failed to consistently provide the student with special
needs with transportation services, and that (2) it failed to address the student's misbehavior
on the bus for almost a year. Id. at 1387.
" Id. at 1389.
149 Id. at 1388.
"S 52 IDELR 298, 1525 (Office for Civil Rights S. Div., D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
' Id at 1526.
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tor skills and his range of motion was limited in all joints.'5 2 The
LEA refused and the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") found no viola-
tion.s 3 The OCR noted that developing an IEP consistent with the
IDEA requirements was one way to meet Section 504's obligation to
provide related services to persons with disabilities "as adequately as
the needs of non-disabled persons are met." 5 4 Under the IDEA, re-
lated services are "required to assist a child with a disability to bene-
fit from special education," whereas here the physician's prescription
was for medical purposes."5 5
This case reflects some practical problems that all too often
prompt disputes in litigation. First, professionals coming from clini-
cal settings are often unaware that an LEA's obligation under the
IDEA to provide related services is limited to those services required
to assist a child to benefit from special education.15 6  The IDEA
standard differs from the "best interests of the child" standard used in
the medical field in that it is a far broader standard.'5 7 Once apprised
of the IDEA standard, the clinical professional will often tell the par-
ent that the standard they have is higher and revise his or her recom-
mendation.5 8
Additional problems in this regard sometimes arise because
clinicians are often unfamiliar with a delivery model other than direct
pull out services, such as the consultive model, and the educational
advantages it may provide to certain students.15 9 Explaining the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the differing service delivery models
to the clinicians may lead to resolution of the differing professional
recommendations.
152 Id
' Id. at 1526-27.
Id. at 1525.
's 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26)(A).
156 But see Marion County, 52 IDELR at 1527 (indicating that the parties knew that medi-
cal physical therapy goes beyond the IEP goals, while educational physical therapy only
supports the educational goals in the student's IEP).
157 See generally 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(26)(A); Loretta M. Kopelman, Children and Bioeth-
ics: Uses andAbuses of the Best-Interests Standard, 22 J. MED. AND PHIL. 213, 213 (1997).
158 See Marion County, 52 IDELR at 1527 (stating that the physical therapist explained to
the parent that medical physical therapy goes beyond the IEP goals, while educational physi-
cal therapy only supports the educational goals in the student's IEP).
9 See N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, No. 09-621(CKK), 2010 WL 1767214,
at *2-*3 (D.D.C. May 4, 2010) (stating that the plaintiffs' doctor "recommended [that] the
maximum amount of special education" pull-out services be implemented).
[Vol. 261166
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G. Meaning of Location
In T. Y ex rel. T Y. v. New York City Department ofEducation,
Region 4,160 a Second Circuit case, the student's IEP stated that the
child would go to school in District 75, which is "a group of schools
that specialize in providing education for [students] with disabili-
ties."'61 The IEP did not name the specific school the student would
attend.162 About "a month after the IEP was formalized, the parents
received a notice in the mail that recommended a specific school
placement." 63  The parents found both this school and a second
school offered by the LEA to be unacceptable and instead enrolled
the student in a private school.164 In requesting a hearing, the parents
contended that the IEP had to include a specific school placement.165
The hearing officer "rejected the parents' argument that the IEP was
procedurally defective because it failed to name a specific school
placement." 66
The parents appealed, contending that the LEA's policy of not
"specifying a particular school in the IEP deprived them of their right
to meaningful[ly] participat[e] in . .. [its] development." 67 The court
rejected the parents' arguments, stating that the term "educational
'a 584 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3277 (2010).
161 Id. at 416.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. After enrolling the child in a specialized private school for children with autism,
T.Y.'s parents "notified the [New York City Department of Education] of their intent to seek
reimbursement." T. Y., 584 F.3d at 416.
165 Id. The parents argued that the Department of Education's failure to include a specific
placement in the IEP constituted a major procedural deficiency. Id.
" Id. at 416-17, 419. The hearing officer explained that T.Y.'s Committee on Special
Education ("CSE") properly identified and suggested a type of program and subsequently
provided the parents with the names of offered schools and an opportunity to visit the sites.
Id. at 416. Accordingly, CSE's failure to identify the specific school at the CSE meeting
was harmless and did not render IEP procedurally deficient. TY, 584 F.3d at 416-17. In
fact, during the hearing, a New York City Department of Education representative testified
that "in New York a specific school placement is never offered at the IEP meeting, and that
the child's placement is rather determined by 'a citywide placement officer who looks at
which school would be the most appropriate.' " Id. at 419. Additionally, Hon. Barrington D.
Parker referred to the United States Department of Education commentary to the 1997
amendment to IDEA, which interpreted the requirement that an IEP specify the location as
merely stating a general setting or environment that is appropriate for providing the neces-
sary service to the child with special needs, rather than the particular facility where the ser-
vices will be provided. Id. at 419-20.
"6 Id. at 419.
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placement" " 'refer[red] only to the general type[s] of educational
program[s] in which the child is placed.' "l68 Furthermore, the court
noted that "the requirement that an IEP specify the 'location' does
not mean that the IEP must specify a specific school site."l 69 In sup-
port of its decision, the Second Circuit quoted OSEP's comments to
the 1997 regulations: "[tihe location of services in the context of an
IEP generally refers to the type of environment that is the appropriate
place for provision of the service."l70 When moving a student, too
many school districts fail to consider the potential LRE implications.
Overlooking these implications when determining which school to
send the student to is potentially a big problem for school districts.
V. BEHAVIOR INTERVENTION PLANS ("BIP") AND DISCIPLINE
A. Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures
The Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services
("OSERS") addressed a host of questions in an attempt to clarify the
IDEA's discipline procedures.17' With regard to whether a school
district may offer "home instruction" as the sole interim alternative
education setting ("IAES") option, OSERS's answer is no. 7 2  The
IAES must be determined by the IEPT and meet the IDEA's re-
quirements with regard to an interim alternative educational setting,
enabling the child to continue in the general education curriculum
and meet his or her IEP goals and objectives. 7 1
168 Id. (quoting Concerned Parents & Citizens for the Continuing Ed. at Malcolm X (PS
79) v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1980)).
169 T. Y, 584 F.3d at 419.
170 Id. at 420 (quoting Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities
and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
12406, 12594 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300, 303)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
171 Questions and Answers on Discipline Procedures, 52 IDELR 231, 1150 (OSERS June
1,2009).
172 Id. at 1152-53.
173 Id
Whether a child's home would be an appropriate interim alternative edu-
cational setting under § 300.530 would depend on the particular circum-
stances of an individual case such as the length of the removal, the extent
to which the child previously has been removed from his or her regular
placement, and the child's individual needs and educational goals. In
general, though, because removals under §§ 300.530(g) and 300.532 will
1168 [Vol. 26
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss4/4
2011] SPECIAL EDUCATION YEAR IN REVIEW 1169
Too often, school districts provide services in the home as an
interim alternative educational setting. This effectively creates a cri-
sis for families where both parents are working because the child is
being sent home unattended. If the school district is able to find a lo-
cation other than the home to provide services to the child on an in-
terim basis, school districts will find the parents responding in a more
favorable manner.
VI. COMPLAINTS, HEARINGS, AND REMEDIES
A. Settlement Offer's Impact on Parent and District
Attorney's Fees
Although the decisions in this area are split, all of these cases
begin with the parents filing due process complaints.174 The school
districts often agree that they erred, but refuse to pay attorneys' fees
as a part of their settlement offers.' 75 The question becomes: When
the settlement offer either does not offer attorneys' fees or offers only
a nominal, is the parent justified in rejecting that settlement offer and
going ahead with a hearing to recover his or her attorneys' fees? 76 It
be for periods of time up to 45 days, care must be taken to ensure that if
home instruction is provided for a child removed under § 300.530, the
services that are provided will satisfy the requirements for services for a
removal under § 300.530(d) and section 615(k)(1)(D) of the Act.
Id. at 1153.
174 34 C.F.R. § 300.507 (2006). The IDEA allows the filing of a due process complaint on
matters such as identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child with disabili-
ties, or the provision of FAPE to the child. Id. However, such complaint has to be very spe-
cific, and many such complaints get dismissed for failure to suffice the necessary pleading
requirements. See M.S.-G. ex rel. K.S.-G v. Lenape Reg'1 High Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 306
F. App'x 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2009).
The complaint must provide notice to the opposing party, "including
'(III) a description of the nature of the problem of the child relating to
such proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to such prob-
lem; and (IV) a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known
and available to the party at the time."
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(III)-(IV)).
1s See, e.g., El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R. ex rel. R.R., 591 F.3d 417, 420 (5th
Cir. 2009) (explaining the "prevailing party" standard that allows the prevailing party to re-
cover attorney's fees); District of Columbia v. Ijeabuonwu, 631 F. Supp. 2d 101, 103
(D.D.C. 2009); Ruben A. ex rel. R.A. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 657 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788-
89 (W.D. Tex. 2009); Y.B. ex rel. A.B. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:08-0999,
2009 WL 4061311, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 2009).
116 See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(3)(E) (allowing a complaining parent to reject the settle-
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appears that the majority of the cases hold that the parent is justified
in rejecting the settlement offer and going ahead with the hearing to
recover attorneys' fees. 7 7
The courts say that the parents are justified in rejecting the
settlement offers because the rulings under the IDEA are more favor-
able than the settlement offers. 7 8  Accepting the settlement offers
would have deprived the parents of obtaining attorneys' fees or made
it impossible, given the waiver of provisions in the settlement of-
fers.179 Under the IDEA's scheme, either a hearing officer or a court
has the authority to make a ruling on whether a decision is more fa-
vorable than a settlement offer. 180
Given these decisions, even though it technically does not
make sense under the IDEA, school districts need to give serious
consideration in their settlement offers in terms of making a reasona-
ble offer on attorneys' fees. Likewise, counsel for the parent must
give serious consideration to how reasonable that offer is because un-
der these decisions, both parties are risking something if the parents
reject the settlement offer.
B. Emails of Educational Records
In S.A. ex rel. L.A. & MA. v. Tulare County Office ofEduca-
tion,'8 ' the parents requested copies of all emails concerning or per-
sonally identifying their ten-year-old son in native file format rather
ment offer and recover attorney's fees and costs, if the parent prevails on his claim, and re-
jection of the settlement offer is "substantially justified").
1 See J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cnty., Va., 641 F. Supp. 2d 499,
525 (E.D. Va. 2009) (awarding over $300,000 in attorney fees and litigation expenses); Y.B.,
2009 WL 4061311, at *9 (allowing the plaintiff to recover limited attorney fees, excluding
the time spent by the counsel at the resolution session); B.L. ex rel. Lax v. District of Co-
lumbia, 517 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2007); R.N. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. D. v. Suffield Bd.
of Educ., 194 F.R.D. 49, 53 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding appropriate the recovery of attorney's
fees and supplemental fees in connection with the summary judgment motion). But see El
Paso, 591 F.3d at 428-29 (finding that parents' rejection of the settlement offer made by the
school district which would include attorney's fees was not substantially justified; parents'
decision not to accept a reasonable offer of settlement was viewed by the court as conduct
that " 'unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the controversy' " (quoting 20
U.S.C.A. 1415(i)(3)(F)(i))).
.. See e.g., YB., 2009 WL 4061311, at *23.
'Id
S.A. ex rel. L.A. & M.A. v. Tulare Cnty. Office of Educ., No. CV F 08-1215 LJO
GSA, 2009 WL 4048656 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009).
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than printed pages.182 The LEA responded by sending the parents
hard copies of the emails that had been placed in the student's per-
manent file.183 The parents filed a complaint with the SEA contend-
ing that all emails, whether printed or in electronic format, were edu-
cational records.184 The SEA upheld the LEA's interpretation.'8 ' The
parents appealed, arguing that all emails were "maintained" in the
LEA's electronic mail system and could be located even if deleted.186
The court agreed with the SEA and noted that the definition
of an educational record does not direct an LEA to maintain a record
that identifies a student.' Additionally, the court found nothing in
the record to support the position that the school district failed to
maintain electronic records in a central location.'88 Therefore, under
the IDEA's scheme, only emails that are copied and put in hardcopy
records are educational records that have to be provided to the par-
ents.189 Since many school districts maintain emails through a central
maintenance system, this decision may not be entirely accurate in
terms of the way most school districts function and maintain their
records under FERPA.
VII. CONCLUSION
This may not have been the typical legal review with regard
to special education. However, hopefully it has been one which has
182 Id. at *1.
183 Id. (explaining that Tulare County Office of Education ("TCOE") did not store emails
in native file format and, therefore, could not produce them in any other format than printed
emails from the student's file).
18 Id. (stating that the parents contended, inter alia, that TCOE unlawfully destroyed the
student's records "without parental notification or consent ... when it unilaterally 'purged'
original electronic files").
"' Id. (finding "that e-mails are not 'education records' to be maintained by the educa-
tional agency and that TCOE was in compliance").
..6 S.A., 2009 WL 4048656, at *1 (relying on the definition of "maintained" set forth in 34
C.F.R. § 99.3).
18 Id. at *2.
188 Id. (holding that after considering "the parties arguments, the administrative record, the
declarations, and the judicially noticeable facts, this [c]ourt issued a September 24, 2009 Or-
der on Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment .... against Student on the predominant issues
of the action").
189 Id. (holding that "plain language of the statute and regulation that define 'education
records' is consistent with California DOE's interpretation that only those emails that both
are maintained by the educational institution and personally identify Student are education
records") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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brought home some of the practical implications of these cases for
parents, school districts, administrators, lawyers in this field, and
hearing officers.
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